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I. Introduction 
For the past ten to twelve months, anyone perusing the cable news channels has 
been bombarded with a steady stream of speculation, propaganda and political analysis 
surrounding the health care debate.  Whether described as an altruistic movement or an 
outrageously expensive move by a totalitarian government intent on controlling the 
behavior of its citizens, the debate has unquestionably been at the forefront of American 
politics.  Included in this discussion has been the perceived success or failure of foreign 
countries in instituting different systems of care.  Countries which have established 
universal health care coverage, such as Canada, have been applauded through popular 
media outlets such as Michael Moore’s documentary Sicko, while others point to 
America as one of the best systems due to its technologically advanced practices and 
innovative development of pharmaceuticals and physician techniques.  These 
comparisons between the United States system and those of foreign countries have often 
been too broad in their focus, relying on uneven comparisons and hand-picked statistics 
to characterize certain systems.       
While health care has always been a public policy concern of the U.S. 
government, its relevance was not magnified until its economic implications were 
recognized.  As health care costs have spiraled at an increasing rate and consumed a 
larger portion of government and personal spending, widespread reform considerations 
have evolved.  Additionally, as many European and industrialized countries have moved 
towards providing insurance coverage to all of its citizens, the United States still has a 
large portion of its population without health insurance.  As a result, comparisons of 
international health care systems have become commonplace. 
 3 
Despite academic attempts to develop measures of health care performance by 
country, an accepted methodology has not been created.  Evaluations of health care 
systems over the years have produced contrasting conclusions as to the best form of 
health care in the world.  In spite of the difficulties in rating the quality of health care 
systems in their entirety, comparisons between health care systems can still present 
noteworthy results.  A more focused approach in comparing health care between 
countries can provide more tangible and useful lessons in improving overall health care 
performance.   
Many of the problems nations have encountered with their health care systems 
have been due to the conditions of the health insurance market.  The United States has 
received considerable criticism of its health insurance industry due to the large profits 
accrued by many insurance companies and low levels of insurance rates throughout the 
population.  The experiences of other countries may be able to offer useful lessons in not 
only the positive strategies employed to improve insurance markets, but also those 
approaches which have failed.  A detailed comparison of the U.S. health insurance 
market with that of another country can provide insight into the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of the U.S. system and into possible methods to improve health insurance in 
the United States.    
  II. Literature Review 
 Due to the complexities of the industry, analyzing the health care system is a 
difficult task.  Unlike typical markets, many people depend on receiving the service of 
health care in order to survive.  Often, the costs of obtaining health care are unpredictable 
and incredibly large.  As a result, people want to purchase insurance because they tend to 
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be risk-averse and are willing to pay a premium to protect themselves against the 
possibility of facing debilitating health care bills.  Although there is both demand for 
insurance and companies willing to supply it, the unique characteristics of insurance 
make this transaction difficult and often problematic.  These obstacles have to do with 
information asymmetries and the moral hazard created from involving third-party payers. 
 The root of most of the complications with health care and health insurance, in 
particular, is a lack of information.  In the case of health care, consumers base their 
purchasing decisions on the advice of the doctor, who happens to be the seller of the 
service as well.  When a person becomes ill, they may know they require medical care, 
but they probably do not know what type of treatment best addresses their needs. Unlike 
other markets where consumers can determine the service they require and gather 
information on the price and quality of the good or service, patients do not have the same 
luxury.  Patients have poor information regarding the benefits and appropriateness of 
medical care.  They rely almost entirely on their doctor’s recommendation.  Doctor-
patient relationships are meant to work towards improving the health of the patient, but it 
is also a relationship between a seller and the buyer.  In the case of medical care, the 
seller has significantly more information than the buyer. 
 What is important to remember regarding information inequality in the health care 
sector is that this is a “difference in information as to the consequence of a purchase of 
medical care” (Arrow, 1963).  There are a number of examples of asymmetric 
information in the production of goods between the buyer and seller.  When purchasing a 
mattress, for instance, the consumer does not know exactly how the mattress was 
produced and under what conditions.  What he or she does know relatively well, however, 
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is how much utility they will receive from purchasing the mattress.  In health care 
transactions, the buyer does not know how much better or worse off they will be after 
purchasing the medical care.  While the doctor may not be 100 percent certain of the 
consequence of the care administered, the information they have is much greater than the 
information known by the patient.  Uncertainty in what is actually received once medical 
care is purchased is a defining characteristic of the industry. 
 The presence of asymmetric information is not solely limited to poor information 
on the buyer’s side.  In fact, the buyer has a considerable informational advantage over 
the seller when purchasing health insurance.  This advantage stems from individuals 
having more knowledge than the insurer regarding their risk of becoming ill or injured 
and utilizing medical services.  Consequently, those who believe they are at a high risk 
for illness or injury will be more likely to purchase health insurance than those who are at 
a low risk.  This adverse selection problem causes the average buyer of insurance to have 
a higher risk than the average person in his or her class (Rosen, 2008).  Facing a higher 
level of risk in its policyholder pool, insurance companies are forced to raise premiums.  
This further discourages healthy, low-risk individuals from purchasing insurance.  Due to 
adverse selection, there is considerable market failure in the provision of health insurance.  
 As health premiums rise due to higher levels of risk within the market, it is not 
just low-risk individuals who end up leaving the market.  For low-income individuals 
with a high risk of illness, premiums may become too expensive and they may be forced 
to drop their insurance coverage.  While the individual will not be able to pay the costs of 
large-scale medical treatment in the future, neither are they able to pay the high insurance 
premiums.  As evidenced by the high rate of uninsured people in low-income households 
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as compared to high-income homes, this appears to be the case.  In 2008, 24.5 percent of 
households with an income under $25,000 did not have health insurance, while only 8.2 
percent of those earning $75,000 or more in income were uninsured (Census 2009).  
Unless people earning higher incomes are relatively less healthy than low-income 
individuals, high health insurance costs seem to be the cause of this disparity in insurance 
rates.  Statistical evidence, however, suggests that individuals in higher income brackets 
are actually healthier.  Based on data from 1998-2000, those in the lowest income decile 
(earning the lowest 10% of incomes), had a life expectancy of 74.7 years.  Those in the 
highest income decile had a life expectancy of 79.2 years (Singh & Siahpush, 2008), 4.5 
years greater than the most deprived segment of the population.  Therefore, it appears 
low-income households are pushed out of the insurance market because of the higher 
premiums caused by adverse selection.  
 Economic theory rests upon individuals responding to incentives, and in the case 
of health insurance, these incentives are strong.  When people know that they have 
insurance to cover some or most of the costs of medical treatment, they become less 
concerned with avoiding risk.  This leads individuals to engage in unhealthy or dangerous 
lifestyles that they would normally not consider.  Further, since insurance subsidizes the 
cost of medical care, it creates the incentive for individuals to overconsume health care.  
This notion, called “moral hazard,” is important to understand when attempting to 
determine the cause of inefficiency and cost inflation in the health care industry.  Moral 
hazard occurs as a result of third party payments, meaning when someone other than the 
policyholder pays for health care costs.  For example, if the insured are only responsible 
for paying 20% of the cost of the service or product received, they will continue to 
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consume additional units of health care until the marginal benefit of that last unit is equal 
to their personal marginal cost.  What happens is that the social marginal cost will be five 
times as much as the individual’s marginal cost, meaning that a portion of care purchased 
is inefficient (marginal cost is greater than the marginal benefit).  Consider the following 
example:   
 
 In the figure above, D1 represents an individual’s demand for doctor visits with a 
100% coinsurance rate.  D2 represents that individual’s demand with a 50% coinsurance 
rate.  Assuming a doctor charges $6 per visit, the patient consumes an inefficient amount 
of visits when responsible for 50% of the visit’s cost.  This inefficiency is represented by 
the shaded region in the graph.  While the above example is basic, it sheds light on the 
inefficiency that pervades the health insurance market.  When consumers do not face the 
full cost of their purchasing decisions, they tend to act inefficiently, purchasing care that 
is not cost-effective for society.  This effect is amplified if the extra care consumed by 
patients with health insurance does not result in discernibly better health outcomes.  
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Evidence of these problems in the United States 
 Research has provided conclusive evidence of the existence of moral hazard in 
health insurance markets in the United States.  Dave and Kaestner (2009) studied the 
effects of Medicare on the behavior of elderly persons.  Their research observed changes 
in health behavior pre- and post-age 65 for those who were uninsured and those who 
were insured prior to age 65 (the age when citizens become eligible for Medicare).  They 
hypothesized that those uninsured before turning the age of 65 would engage in riskier 
and unhealthier behavior upon the receipt of Medicare.  The results of their research 
confirmed this, finding that among elderly men, the moral hazard effects associated with 
the receipt of Medicare are:  
• a 39.7% decrease in the probability of engaging in vigorous physical exercise; 
• an 18.0% lower probability of quitting cigarette use; 
• a 15.8% higher prevalence of daily smoking; 
• 22.7% higher cigarette consumption; 
• a 14.8% increase in the probability of daily alcohol consumption; 
• and a 31.8% increase in the probability of current alcohol use  
o Source: Dave and Kaestner 2006 
 
As individuals transitioned from not having health insurance to being covered by 
Medicare, their tendency towards unhealthy behavior increased.  The theory of moral 
hazard is an important phenomenon that has a profound effect on the behavior of 
individuals in response to receiving health insurance.  In designing health policy, these 
effects should be taken into consideration.  
Evidence of adverse selection is provided in Browne’s 1992 study, “Evidence of 
Adverse Selection in the Individual Health Insurance Market.”  Browne tests for the 
presence of adverse selection in the market for individual health insurance by comparing 
the amount of insurance purchased by low-risk families in the individual market with the 
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predicted amount they would have purchased through the group market (Browne, 1992).  
This predicted amount is derived from the demand equation specified with group market 
data provided by the National Medical Care Expenditures Survey.  The group market is 
believed to suffer less from adverse selection because insurance is typically received 
through employment.  When insurance is a benefit tied to employment, it is more difficult 
for low risk people to leave the insurance pool, thus decreasing the amount of adverse 
selection.  Browne’s model specifies the dummy variable LOW RISK in the model to 
determine the effect of an individual’s risk on their insurance purchasing decisions.  The 
estimated coefficient on this variable was found to be positive and significant, indicating 
that the difference between predicted and actual insurance purchases is greater for those 
with low risk than high risk.  This is indicative of the presence of adverse selection within 
the individual health insurance market.   
A common suggested solution to the pervasive problems of health care systems is 
incorporating more consumer choice and cost sharing.  The movement of this idea started 
with a well-known RAND Experiment by Joseph Newhouse.  This experiment assigned 
families to randomized health insurance plans that had varying degrees of cost sharing. 
One plan included no cost-sharing on the consumer’s part (0% coinsurance rate), while 
others were given a coinsurance rate as high as 95 percent with a stop-loss limit of $1,000 
in 1970 dollars.  The study observed that those families with large deductibles used 25-30 
percent fewer services than those with no coinsurance, which amounted to just less than 
two physician visits per person per year.  These numbers provided evidence that those 
who paid a larger share of the costs of health care ended up significantly reducing their 
expenditures.  Even more noteworthy was that the discrepancy in use between plans 
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appeared to have “no effect on health status” (Newhouse, 2004).  This implies that the 
additional services used by those with lower cost-sharing plans were essentially 
unnecessary.  This system has evolved to be known today as Consumer-Directed Health 
Care (CDHC) and has gained momentum both domestically and abroad.   
The core concept of CDHC is the same as the implication of the Newhouse study.  
Essentially, CDHC attempts to involve consumers more in the process of buying health 
care.  By having a larger stake in considering the cost of the healthcare they demand, the 
efficient (or a more efficient) quantity will be purchased (Hughes-Cromwick, Root, & 
Roehrig, 2007).  Given the unique characteristic of healthcare that consumers base their 
buying decisions on the judgment of the doctor or health professional, consumers need to 
be aware of the quality of the products and services they receive.  Within the United 
States, many critics of CDHC assert that a lack of accurate and accessible information 
makes the system unfeasible.  Those in favor of CDHC respond that the necessary 
information will become available after CDHC is implemented.  The prediction asserts 
that consumers will increase their demand for the information to make informed 
healthcare decisions (Hughes-Cromwick, 2007).  Given the benefits of CDHC and the 
problems with the current U.S. system, CDHC is worthy of consideration by 
policymakers who wish to address many of the fundamental impediments of the health 
insurance industry.    
Asymmetric information, moral hazard, and adverse selection are not merely 
theoretical phenomena that takes place within a vacuum.  They are observable influences 
that have profound effects on the market for health care and health insurance.  These are 
problems faced not only within the U.S. industry but worldwide.  The way in which 
governments and markets have attempted to mediate these problems between countries, 
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however, is different.  In the following section we will observe these strategies and the 
potential lessons learned from each.   
Examining Foreign Health Systems 
 
 Attempting to use other countries’ health care systems as a model for U.S. reform 
has provided valuable reform implications in the past.  There are several sources which 
compare the U.S. system to the British, Canadian, French, and Swiss systems in an 
attempt to determine the superior aspects of each.  This research has been sparked 
primarily by publications by organizations such as the World Health Organization, which 
ranked the United States 37th in overall health system performance in 2001 (Health 
Systems, 2000).  While the methodology of the WHO’s research has been questionable by 
many standards, it has facilitated deeper discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of 
different health systems.  As costs have risen more rapidly in the U.S. than any other 
country in the world, the possibility of its extra spending not improving the performance 
of the U.S. health system is alarming.  At the same time, the desire to establish universal 
coverage in the U.S. is equally pertinent.  How should the U.S. go about achieving both 
of these goals simultaneously?   
 One country that has solved some of the problems facing U.S. health insurance 
while struggling with others is the United Kingdom.  The U.K. has, to its credit, been 
able to establish universal coverage while controlling its healthcare expenditures at the 
same time.  In 2009, British health expenditures were 8.4% of GDP, which is less than 
the 8.9% OECD average and just over half the 16.0% of GDP the United States spends 
(OECD, 2009).  Given the policy goals of health care reform in the U.S., why not attempt 
to imitate the British system?  The reason is that the U.K. is one of the best examples of 
the problems associated with third party payments.  With its single-payer system, the 
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British have controlled the monetary costs of its healthcare system via restrictions on 
price and access.  Even though Great Britain’s system mediates the financial strain of 
health care relative to the U.S., there are additional costs that are unaccounted for in its 
monetary health expenditures.  The average wait time in National Health Service 
Hospitals was 78 days in 2006 (Godden & Pollock, 2007).  Consumers do not face the 
full cost of their health care decisions, so they tend to consume more than the efficient 
amount of care.  In 2004, the government set an 18-week target for waiting times, but as 
of June 2007, less than half were actually treated within this time period (Rose, 2007).   
With nearly all health care funding coming from the government, hospitals and 
other health care producers must adhere to strict budgets.  Due to producers’ inability to 
raise prices and in turn their profits as demand increases, extensive wait times have been 
the result.  In fact, waiting times have been imposed for some producers by the National 
Health Service itself.  The British government feared that patients would seek out the 
more efficient hospitals with short wait times and that these hospitals would end up 
spending their budgeted resources too quickly.  While Great Britain has achieved the 
important goals of cost-containment and universal coverage, the rationing of care 
associated with this system of national health insurance makes it a poor model for U.S. 
health care reform. 
Many researchers consider the French system to be the best functioning system in 
the world.  The French system is characterized by a system of national health care much 
like other European countries, but one which employs market forces as well.  The entire 
population is forced to pay compulsory health insurance provided by non-profit agencies.  
These organizations negotiate with the state regarding funding of health care in France.  
 13 
While these private entities operate the insurance market, the government sets the price 
and benefits of insurance packages.  Essentially, these are quasi-public organizations 
supervised by the government.  Between 99 and 100 percent of the population is covered 
by this national system (Mossé, 1994).  Medical fees are paid up front by patients and are 
then reimbursed by insurers for most (usually 75-85%) of the cost.  Patients have the 
freedom to choose where to receive care, with little regulation prohibiting access to 
specialists and hospitals.  In order to fund the national system, workers are taxed roughly 
18.8 percent of their income.  
The French system has been able to avoid many of the pitfalls of other national 
insurance systems because of its utilization of market forces.  Wait times are often a 
consequence of providing highly accessible care to the general population, but this has 
historically not been problematic in France.  The system has not encountered significant 
problems with rationing of care by incorporating some level of cost-sharing.  While co-
payments, on average, are less than in the U.S., this cost sharing has removed some of the 
moral hazard that induces patients to over-utilize health care resources.  In recent years, 
however, there have been slowly increasing wait times for specialized treatments and 
technologies such as MRI and CAT scans.  In response to this, the government began 
imposing restrictions on access to physicians in 2005, adopting a system of “coordinated 
care pathways” (Petkantchin,  2007).  In some respect, the French system is moving 
towards a U.S. system of HMOs and PPOs in order to curb its health care expenditures.   
Despite its ability to establish universal coverage and generally avoid the 
problems with rationing of care that confront the U.K., France faces many of the same 
problems the U.S. system does.  Similar to Medicare/Medicaid in the U.S., the health care 
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system is the largest single factor driving France’s overall budget deficit (Tanner, 2008).  
In 2006, the French health care system ran a €10.3 billion deficit as part of the nation’s 
€49.6 billion total deficit.  If expenditures had continued to follow their trend leading up 
to 2006, health care expenditures in 2010 would contribute €29 billion to the deficit 
(Mossé, 1994).  A large contributor to growing costs is patients seeking second and third 
opinions from doctors until they receive a diagnosis they prefer.  These escalating costs 
are mirrored by U.S. Medicare, Medicaid and social security costs.  Consider the figure 
below:  
 
Source: http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/03/A-Guide-to-Fixing-Social-Security-Medicare-
and-Medicaid  
While the French system is a useful health care model to examine because of its 
relative success in achieving universal coverage and access to all levels of care, it is not 
the best.  Non-government sources account for roughly 20 percent of all health care 
spending, which is less than most countries with national health care systems.  This 
 15 
utilization of market forces has reduced the effects of moral hazard within health care, 
but only somewhat.  Though access in France to medical care is perhaps the best in the 
world, some form of limitation of access to specialists will be necessary in the future to 
reduce costs.  The early signs of this have been shown by the recent “coordinated care 
pathways” adopted by the French government.  A system that utilizes market forces and 
higher levels of cost-sharing would provide a more useful comparison with the U.S. 
system.   
 While debate has continued over the theoretical merits of Consumer-Directed 
Health Care, there have been examples of its effects taking place in the real world.  
Herzlinger and Parsa-Parsi (2004) examined health insurance within the consumer-
oriented health care model of Switzerland compared to the employer and government-
based U.S. system.  In their research, they attempt to discuss the true merits of what they 
refer to as “Consumer-Driven Health Care” or CDHC.  Studies released by iPlan, a 
United Health Group company, asserted that enrollees in CDHC realized substantial 
decreases in their number of surgeries, specialty visits, and laboratory services 
(Herzlinger & Parsa-Parsi, 2004).  While many believe that these cost reductions can be 
maintained long-term through consumer engagement, some believe that the savings are 
one-time items and that “typical cost trends will reemerge” (Herzlinger & Parsa-Parsi, 
2004).  Despite its mandated basic health insurance benefits, the writers believed that 
Switzerland was an appropriate case-study to examine the merit of CDHC.  
 In order to control for income and education level for their analysis, Herzlinger 
and Parsa-Parsi selected U.S. states whose sociodemographic characteristics most closely 
matched Switzerland’s.  In comparing Switzerland with Connecticut, Maryland, and 
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Massachusetts, Switzerland performed markedly better in controlling health care 
expenses per capita, infant mortality rates, and number of inpatient beds per capita.  The 
majority of their findings indicated that the Swiss system was superior, though the 
authors did offer some criticism.  Patients receive subsidies for inpatient care but not 
outpatient or short-stay inpatient care in the Swiss system.  This may lead to patients 
being unnecessarily admitted to hospital care.  Additionally, in order for a procedure or 
treatment to be covered by basic insurance, it must be approved by the Swiss Federal 
Office of Public Health.  As a result of this system, innovations in the delivery of care are 
constrained by payments being tied to specific benefits outlined by the Federal Health 
Insurance Act (Herzlinger & Parsa-Parsi, 2004).  Overall, however, they conclude that 
the Swiss system is more efficient in providing care given the country’s lower per-capita 
health costs and universal coverage.  These results are possible in the eyes of the authors 
through “high cost transparency of the system, requirement for universal coverage, and 
risk adjustment for the insurers” (Herzlinger, 2004).  
 In contrast to Herzlinger and Parsa-Parsi, Uwe Reinhardt (2004) sees the Swiss 
model as an imperfect representation of Consumer-Directed Health Care.  In Switzerland, 
as Reinhardt points out, there is tight government regulation throughout the entire system.  
While insurance is purchased in the private market, the government sets the price and 
stipulates the benefits of such insurance policies.  Additionally, in a purely consumer-
directed system, cost sharing by patients leads to a demand for superior quality 
information.  Swiss patients, however, have very little information on the quality of care 
received.  Instead, the Swiss government is in charge of regulating the quality of health 
care delivered and this information is not openly distributed to citizens.    
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Aside from subsidies to low-income individuals for the purchase of compulsory 
health insurance, the Swiss government acts strictly as a regulator.  Under this regulation, 
the free market pays for and provides health care.  Although Reinhardt is correct in his 
assertion that the Swiss system is not entirely based on Consumer-Driven Health Care, it 
does have many of the core elements of such a system.  Most importantly, the Swiss 
system is characterized by high levels of cost-sharing through high deductibles and co-
insurance rates.  The Swiss system is quite similar to the French national system except it 
employs more cost-sharing and private market forces.  For these reasons, Switzerland is 
an appropriate system to attempt to observe the effects of consumer-directed health care.  
 Additional research comparing the Swiss and U.S. systems attempts to explain the 
disparity in health care efficiency based on differences in national character.  Michael 
Tanner, in his look at different health care systems around the world, suggests that “Swiss 
national character… may not be replicable in the United States where the record of 
complying with mandates is much more mixed” (Tanner, 2008).  He points out that only 
83% of U.S. drivers carry mandated auto insurance, while 100 percent of Swiss drivers 
comply with an equivalent mandate.  Taking Tanner’s view, any type of government 
mandate would be only marginally successful at best, not because the concept is flawed, 
but because Americans are unwilling to follow the rules.  If cultural differences are too 
extensive, any lessons to be taken from one country to the other may be diluted or even 
worthless.   
 In recognition of the specific goals of current U.S. reform legislation, universal 
coverage and cost containment, Switzerland provides the most appropriate case study.  
Although the Swiss system has encountered rising costs, its market-oriented approach 
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provides the most likely and innovative solutions to America’s health care system 
problems.  As mentioned earlier, previous studies have attempted to analyze the Swiss 
system in order to observe effective strategies that can be translated to the U.S.  This has 
involved comparing the costs of basic health insurance in Switzerland, the country’s 
expenditure per capita on health, and overall cost trends.  What research has failed to 
account for, however, is what patients actually receive from their respective health care 
plans.   
 Current research seems to reiterate the fact that the Swiss health care system is 
less expensive and more people are covered in Switzerland than the U.S.  Most of this 
research has been very general in nature, comparing the two systems based on their 
characteristics as described by rhetoric in legislation and big-picture reports such as the 
WHO Health Systems Report.  What is missing is a more specific approach that 
determines what the insured actually receive for what they are paying.  What if it were 
the case that Swiss insurance, while less expensive than its American counterpart, did not 
cover emergency services?  Perhaps it is the case that most U.S. health policies cover 
procedures such as Gastric Bypass Surgery, but the Swiss policy does not because obesity 
is a lifestyle choice.  It is these types of considerations that I aim to factor out in order to 
better control for price and quality differences.  Once it is possible to consider the two 
systems at a more precise level and compare them, more accurate suggestions for 
improving each system, particularly that of the U.S., can be made.  By taking a step-by-
step approach in comparing what consumers pay for health care and what they actually 
receive, this analysis can take place. 
  III. Explanation of Methodology/Data Sources 
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  A. Swiss Health Insurance 
  To facilitate a comparison of costs and benefits of health insurance policies, a 
deeper understanding of each system must first be established.  The Swiss health 
insurance system was transformed in 1996 when the Federal Health Insurance Act of 
1994 was implemented.  The principal component of this legislation was to create a 
mandate for every resident of Switzerland to purchase a standardized health insurance 
policy within three months of taking up residence.  Insurance companies are required to 
accept all applicants and offer the same package of benefits within the compulsory 
insurance package.  Additionally, premiums are community-rated, meaning they are the 
same for each person with a particular company within a Swiss state, called a  canton 
(Jacobs & Goddard, 2000).  This means that an 80 year old and 30 year old from the 
same canton pay equal premiums if they hold health insurance under the same company.   
Patients, on the other hand, have freedom to choose their provider and insurer.  
Given that all compulsory health insurance plans contain the same benefits, insurers 
compete primarily on price.  Furthermore, all insurance companies that offer compulsory 
insurance cannot pursue profit and must comply with the requirements of the health 
insurance law.  Considering their inability to pursue profit in offering compulsory 
insurance, what is the incentive for insurance companies to stay in the market?  The 
reason is that consumers may also purchase supplementary insurance, usually from the 
same company from which they purchase compulsory coverage.  Once residents purchase 
compulsory health insurance, they have the opportunity to scale up their plans by 
purchasing supplementary insurance.  For this coverage, insurance companies are 
allowed to refuse to insure certain people and base premiums on the risk that an 
individual represents.  Roughly 40 percent of Swiss citizens have purchased supplemental 
insurance (Daley, 2000).  Accordingly, insurers earn profit through the supplementary 
market.  Given the tendency of consumers to purchase their supplementary care from the 
 20 
same insurer which they purchased compulsory coverage from, insurance companies 
have an incentive to offer basic coverage. 
While insurance companies do compete on the basis of price, there is significant 
government regulation of insurance costs to protect the consumer.  Swiss health 
insurance is characterized by higher consumer cost-sharing compared to other European 
and North American healthcare systems.  Premiums vary within cantons because each 
cantonal authority places their own limits on insurance premiums.  Across all of 
Switzerland, the average monthly health insurance premium in 2009 was CHF 323, or 
$306.54.   A standard deductible of CHF 300 ($282.30) per year is paid for those over 18 
years of age and who are not exempt based on military, educational, or occupational 
considerations.  On top of this deductible, policy-holders pay a retention fee of 10 percent 
of the remaining invoiced amount, with a maximum of CHF 700 ($648.70) per year.  
Therefore, cost-sharing contributions (which do not include premiums) to insurance 
policies by the insured for compulsory coverage amounts to a maximum of CHF 1,000 
($940.47) per year.  This amount may be different for those who select a higher optional 
deductible in order to reduce their premiums, which many residents choose.  Residents 
are also eligible for subsidies to purchase compulsory health care based on their income.  
These subsidies ensure that no person or family has to pay more than 10 percent of their 
total income (Jacobs & Goddard, 2000).  The system does make sure that everyone 
contributes some amount to their health insurance.  Even the lowest income brackets are 
required to contribute towards premiums and deductibles on some level.     
Despite the significant amount of government regulation involved with Swiss 
health insurance, Switzerland has one of the more market-oriented systems in the world.  
The Swiss government pays a significantly smaller percentage of total health 
expenditures than the U.S., accounting for 24.9 percent of costs as opposed to 44.7 
percent (Daley, 2000).  Since the insured are fully exposed to the cost of their insurance 
purchases,  many Swiss have chosen the optional, high-deductible insurance.  Out of 
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pocket payments represent 31.5 percent of health care in Switzerland, over twice the 
percentage in the United States (Daley, 2000).  With the onus of purchasing health 
insurance and paying for a large percentage of the costs placed squarely on the shoulders 
of consumers, the moral hazard that plagues health insurance is strongly reduced   
B. U.S. Health Insurance 
The majority of those with health insurance in the United States receive it through 
their employers.  Roughly 60% of the American population receives coverage through a 
private plan, while 25% are covered through a government agency.  Within private plans,  
88 percent is employment-based, while the rest purchase insurance directly (Kaiser 2008).  
Instead of conventional health plans, the majority of health insurance policies are under a 
managed care model.  Managed care is a technique that is meant to reduce the cost of 
health benefits and improve the quality of care.  These network-based plans may be 
“closed” or “open-paneled.”  Insurance companies contract with a network of health care 
providers and enrollees participating in a closed network are only covered when they go 
to the specified network providers.  In an open plan, some coverage is provided when the 
insured use a non-network provider, but less coverage is provided than if the patient were 
to use one of the network providers.  Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) are 
generally open paneled, while many Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) are 
close paneled.  According to the 2009 Kaiser Family Foundation Employer Benefits 
Survey, 58% of covered workers are enrolled in Preferred Provider Organizations, while 
20% are in HMOs and the remaining 12% participate in Point of Service (POS) plans.  
POS plans are essentially a combination of an HMO and PPO plan. 
The market for health insurance is highly concentrated, with large insurance 
companies possessing significant market power.  Nearly all non-governmental insurance 
companies are for-profit entities and are able to charge different premiums based on the 
implied risk that an individual or family represents.  By providing insurance for large 
groups of people, the insurer is able to pool risk in order to dilute the financial effects of 
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major medical costs.  In 2006, the nation’s top two insurers had total membership of 67 
million (Fletcher, 2007).  In many regions in the U.S., only one or two insurance 
companies offer health insurance, leading to monopolistic and oligopolistic behavior.  
Although many companies operate across the entire nation, the insurance industry is 
regulated primarily by individual state insurance departments.  As a result, insurance 
regulation varies significantly from state to state in its severity.  The role of state 
insurance departments is primarily to set licensing requirements for companies and 
brokers.  Generally, these departments have little influence on the premiums and other 
associated costs of health insurance within the state. 
While the majority of health insurance is purchased on the private market in the 
U.S., Medicare and Medicaid are two governmental programs that provide “medical and 
health-related services to specific groups of people in the United States” (Fletcher, 2007).  
Medicaid is primarily meant to serve families with low incomes and few resources, a 
group who most likely could not afford the cost of purchasing a private health insurance 
policy.  People with disabilities are also often eligible to receive Medicaid benefits.  It is 
a federal program, but each state defines its own eligibility standards, scope of services, 
and rate of payment for services.  While intended for the poor population in America, it is 
estimated that about 60% of America’s poor are not covered by the program (Fletcher, 
2007). 
Medicare is a federal insurance program that covers hospital and medical care for 
elderly Americans.  The program is split into 4 parts which cover different aspects of care.  
Part A deals with hospital insurance, paying for stays in a hospital or skilled nursing 
facility, as well as some forms of home health care.  Part B pays for physician visits and 
services, outpatient hospital visits, and other examinations and equipment.  Part C allows 
users to create a customized plan which is more closely aligned with their needs.  This 
often involves a coordinated effort with Health Maintenance Organizations or Preferred 
Provider Organizations.  In 2006, Medicare Part D, a prescription drug plan, was 
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included as part of the Medicare program.  It is administered by private insurance 
companies which offer plans with varying costs depending on the drugs that are covered.  
The program is meant to ease the financial burden that many elderly Americans face 
related to their prescription drug bills.  
Despite the availability of these government programs, many Americans do not 
hold health insurance.  According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 46.3 million people were 
without health insurance in 2008, representing 15.4 percent of the population (Census 
2009).  With the majority of health insurance sponsored by employers, the 9.5% of 
people unemployed as of March 5th face difficulties in obtaining coverage (BLS, 2009).  
Programs meant to address this issue, such as Medicaid, have been largely unsuccessful.  
As one of the few industrialized nations with a high rate of uninsured families, providing 
universal coverage is a primary health care reform goal.       
 
Comparing U.S. and Swiss Health Insurance 
Given the complexity of the U.S. insurance market, it is neither feasible nor valuable 
to attempt to compare a standardized Swiss insurance policy to one over-arching U.S. 
policy.  The variety of private, public, employer-based, and individual insurance policies 
issued in the U.S. poses a challenge in comparing the two.  In order to represent the 
American insurance system as close as possible, three different types of insurance are 
presented.  Between these three insurance policies, a representative cross-section of 
American health insurance may be realized.  These three programs are: 
• Medicare Part A (Hospital Insurance) and Part B (Medical Insurance) 
• Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program 
• LACCD (Los Angeles Community College District)  
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As of 2008, roughly 87% of private insurance was purchased through an employer, 
while Medicare accounted for 49% of all government health insurance programs (Census, 
2008). As subsidized Swiss compulsory care will not be considered in this analysis, 
Medicaid is not included either.  By including two employer-provided insurance plans 
and Medicare parts A& B, the general principle sources of health insurance are included.    
Ideally, a comparative analysis which observes the price of each benefit package 
while controlling for benefits would occur.  That way, a definitive statement regarding 
benefits received per dollar spent on health insurance could be made.  Given the structure 
of health insurance programs in each country, however, this precise quantitative analysis 
is not possible.  Instead, policies must be compared on more of a qualitative level.  By 
determining which benefits are and are not included between packages and observing the 
costs of each, we can approximate the marginal cost of the extra benefits provided in 
either plan.  Even though definitive cost savings or premiums paid between American 
and Swiss plans cannot be made, valuable conclusions of health benefits and their costs 
can.    
To begin this comparison, first consider the benefits provided through the Federal 
Employees Health Benefits Program and the compulsory Swiss package.  The FEHB 
program covers government employees in organizations such as the Department of 
Defense, U.S. Postal Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, among others.  It is 
the largest employer-sponsored health program in the United States.  Employees have a 
number of different plans available to them, but only the most common, Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield Standard Service Benefit Plan (USOPM, 2010) will be considered in this 
comparison.  The table below offers a side-by side comparison: 
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Benefit Swiss Compulsory Policy FEHB Policy 
Physician Services • “Normally pay for all 
treatments carried out by a 
doctor.” 
• Psychotherapy (under 
certain conditions). 
• Nutritional Advice 
 
• Diagnostic and treatment 
services in office. 
• Office visits, home visits, 
outpatient consultations, 
outpatient 2nd surgical options. 
• Nutritional Counseling 
Inpatient Hospital 
Care 
• Stays and treatment in 
general wards.  
• Maternity care (7 routine 
antenatal exams and two 
ultrasounds) 
• Birth of the baby. 
• One post-natal examination.  
• Basic health insurance will 
only cover costs for 
hospitals within the holder's 
canton of residence except 
in case of emergency. 
• Cannot choose physician 
freely 
• Room and board: semiprivate or 
intensive care accommodations. 
• General nursing care. 
• Operating, recovery, maternity, 
and other treatment rooms. 
• Internal prosthetic devices. 
• Can go outside of network for 
physician services, but non-
PPO charges apply. 
 
Outpatient hospital 
care 
 
• Outpatient services covered 
 
• Special treatment rooms, tests, 
chemo/radiation therapy and 
15% of the plan allowance,  
• Outpatient surgery and related 
services 
• Ambulance transport services 
Prescription Drugs • Covers cost of all medicines 
prescribed by doctor. 
• 2400 medicines are 
currently covered, with the 
list expanding. 
•  All drugs prescribed by a 
physician. 
• Insulin and diabetic test strips. 
• Drugs to aid smoking cessation 
that require a prescription by 
Federal Law. 
• Limited Contraceptive drugs 
and devices. 
Coverage abroad • Only emergency treatment 
is covered abroad. 
• Basic insurance will only 
pay up to twice the amount 
the same treatment would 
cost in Switzerland. 
• Will not cover 
transportation costs back to 
Switzerland and only 50% 
of emergency transportation 
to the next hospital abroad. 
• Are able to file claims for 
inpatient facility care for you—
without an advanced payment. 
• Drugs purchased overseas must 
be the equivalent to drugs that 
by Federal U.S. Law require a 
prescription.  
Maternity • Everything covered 
• Must buy supplementary 
insurance to choose 
gynecologist.  
• Prenatal care 
• Delivery 
• Postpartum care 
Dental Care • No Dental Benefits (only • Under the Standard Option, 
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those connected to serious 
general illness).  
fixed, scheduled amounts are 
paid as determined by the type 
of treatment/operation received.  
Medical 
Prevention 
• costs to detect early stages 
of disease are covered. 
• Home and office visits for 
routing (screening) physical 
exams. 
 
Vision Services • CHF 180 ($168.70) per year 
towards spectacle lenses up 
to the age of 18. 
• CHF 180 every 5 years 
towards spectacle lenses 
after 19th birthday. 
The following benefits are 
prescribed for accidental ocular 
injury or intraocular surgery: 
• One pair of eyeglasses or 
contact lenses 
• 1 pair of replacement lenses 
Otherwise, only routine eye 
examinations are provided. 
Physical/Mental 
Health Therapy 
• 10 clarification and therapy 
sessions are covered.  
• Physical therapy prescribed 
by a doctor (up to 9 sessions 
in 3-month period).  
 
 
• Treatment by a chiropractor 
is covered even if not 
prescribed by a doctor.  
• Advice for diabetic patients 
• Speech therapy 
• Occupational Therapy 
• Physical therapy, occupational 
therapy, and speech therapy 
when performed by a licensed 
therapist or physician.  
• Cognitive rehabilitation 
therapy. 
• Hearing tests 
Sources: USOPM, 2010 and FOPH, 2010  
 
As the table demonstrates, there is significant overlap in the services covered by 
Swiss compulsory health care and the FEHB policies.  The major differences between the 
two plans seem to consist primarily of issues of patient privacy and choice.  These 
differences will be discussed in more detail later.   
Next, consider the benefits provided by Medicare Parts A&B compared to the 
compulsory Swiss policy.  
  
 
Benefit Swiss Compulsory Policy Medicare A & B 
Physician 
Services 
• “Normally pay for all 
treatments carried out by a 
doctor.” 
• Physician and nursing services. 
• X-rays, laboratory and 
diagnostic tests. 
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• Psychotherapy (under certain 
conditions). 
• Nutritional Advice 
 
• Vaccinations 
• Blood transfusions. 
• Chemo & Radiation therapy 
Inpatient 
Hospital Care 
• Stays and treatment in general 
wards.  
• Maternity care (7 routine 
antenatal exams and two 
ultrasounds) 
• Birth of the baby. 
• One post-natal examination.  
• Basic health insurance will 
only cover costs for hospitals 
within the holder's canton of 
residence except in case of 
emergency. 
• Cannot choose physician 
freely 
• All care a doctor says you need 
in inpatient hospital care to treat 
illness or injury.  
• Inpatient hospital stays 
(including semiprivate room, 
food, tests, and doctor’s fees). 
• Stay in skilled nursing facilities 
if diagnosed by doctor. 
 
Outpatient 
hospital care 
• Outpatient services covered • Does not cover long-term care 
activities. 
• Outpatient hospital procedures. 
Prescription 
Drugs 
• Covers cost of all medicines 
prescribed by doctor. 
• 2400 medicines are currently 
covered, with the list 
expanding 
• Requires Medicare Part D: 
Prescription Drug Plans. 
Coverage is not standardized, 
but companies choose which 
drugs they wish to cover. 
Coverage abroad • Only emergency treatment is 
covered abroad. 
• Basic insurance will only pay 
up to twice the amount the 
same emergency treatment 
would cost in Switzerland. 
• Will not cover transportation 
costs back to Switzerland and 
only 50% of emergency 
transportation to the next 
hospital abroad. 
• No abroad coverage 
Maternity • Everything covered 
• Must buy supplementary 
insurance to choose 
gynecologist.  
N/A 
Dental Care • No Dental Benefits (only 
those connected to serious 
general illness).  
• No dental care covered. 
Medical 
Prevention 
• costs to detect early stages of 
disease are covered. 
• Extensive preventive services 
Vision Services • CHF 180 (($168.70) per year 
towards spectacle lenses 
• Only covers eyeglasses or 
contact lenses following 
cataract surgery with an 
implanted intraocular lens.  
• No coverage for routine eye 
exams, except for glaucoma and 
certain cases of macular 
degeneration. 
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Physical/Mental 
Health Therapy 
• 10 clarification and therapy 
sessions are covered.  
• Physical therapy prescribed by 
a doctor (up to 9 sessions in 3-
month period).  
• Treatment by a chiropractor is 
covered even if not prescribed 
by a doctor.  
• Advice for diabetic patients 
• Speech therapy 
• Occupational Therapy 
• Cardiac rehabilitation 
program(includes exercise, 
education, and counseling) for 
those who are referred to doctor 
after certain cardiac 
events/surgeries. 
• Diabetes Self-Management 
Training 
• Counseling to stop smoking 
Source: Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 2009.  
Medicare Part D, the prescription drug plan of Medicare, is not included in this 
comparison because of its complexity of benefits and costs.  As such, the differences in 
prescription drug coverage are not considered in any further analysis.   
The last U.S. insurance policy observed is the Los Angeles Community College 
District (LACCD) insurance plan.  As with the FEHB program, employees have a few 
different insurance options at their disposal.  Again, only the most commonly selected 
plan, the CalPERS Select Health Plan, is considered.  
  
Benefit Swiss Compulsory Policy CalPERS Select 
Physician 
Services 
• “Normally pay for all 
treatments carried out by a 
doctor.” 
• Psychotherapy (under certain 
conditions). 
• Nutritional Advice 
 
• Office visits 
• Periodic Health 
Exam/Preventive Care 
• Gynecological exam 
• Immunizations 
• Allergy Testing/Treatment 
• X-Ray 
Inpatient 
Hospital Care 
• Stays and treatment in general 
wards.  
• Maternity care (7 routine 
antenatal exams and two 
ultrasounds) 
• Birth of the baby. 
• One post-natal examination.  
• Basic health insurance will 
only cover costs for hospitals 
within the holder's canton of 
residence except in case of 
emergency. 
• Cannot choose physician 
freely 
• Stay in semi-private or 
intensive care accommodations. 
• Skilled nursing care.  
• Medical and behavioral care. 
• Emergency services 
• Ambulance Services 
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Outpatient 
hospital care 
• Outpatient services covered • Outpatient facility services 
(medical and behavioral) 
Prescription 
drugs 
• Covers cost of all medicines 
prescribed by doctor. 
• 2400 medicines are currently 
covered, with the list 
expanding. 
• Brand name and generic ($30 
and $15 co-pay, respectively). 
• Medical necessity/Partial 
waiver. 
• Mail order pharmacy program. 
 
Coverage abroad • Only emergency treatment is 
covered abroad. 
• Basic insurance will only pay 
up to twice the amount the 
same treatment would cost in 
Switzerland. 
• Will not cover transportation 
costs back to Switzerland and 
only 50% of emergency 
transportation to the next 
hospital abroad. 
• Inpatient hospital care outside 
of the U.S. 
• Access to prescription 
medication 
Maternity • Everything covered 
• Must buy supplementary 
insurance to choose 
gynecologist.  
• Pre-natal/Post-natal care visits 
• Delivery 
• Postpartum care 
Dental Care • No Dental Benefits (only 
those connected to serious 
general illness).  
• Not covered (purchased 
separately) 
Medical 
Prevention 
• costs to detect early stages of 
disease are covered. 
• Periodic health 
exams/preventive care 
Vision Services • CHF 180 ($168.70) per year 
towards spectacle lenses 
• Vision exam/screening 
• Eyeglasses not covered 
 
 
Physical/Mental 
Health Therapy 
 
• 10 clarification and therapy 
sessions are covered.  
• Physical therapy prescribed by 
a doctor (up to 9 sessions in 3-
month period).  
• Treatment by a chiropractor is 
covered even if not prescribed 
by a doctor.  
• Advice for diabetic patients 
• Speech therapy 
• Occupational Therapy 
 
• Substance abuse treatment 
• Physical therapy 
• Occupational therapy 
• Speech Therapy 
• Limited hospice care covered 
• Hearing aid services. 
 
 
 
IV. Results of Analysis 
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After reviewing the benefits of three different American health insurance plans, 
the tables on the following pages summarize the differences of each with Basic 
Compulsory Health Insurance Plan of Switzerland.   
 
Swiss Compulsory Coverage  
Yes No 
Yes • Diagnostic and treatment 
services in office 
• General Nursing Care 
• Nutritional Counseling 
• Maternity care (routine 
antenatal, ultrasound, and 
post-natal examinations). 
• Home nursing care 
• Partially covered emergency 
treatment abroad.  
• Preventive medical care (i.e. 
screening for HIV, 
gynecological screenings, 
diphtheria and tetanus shots, 
etc.) 
• Vision examinations 
•  Limited physiotherapy 
• Psychological testing 
  
• Room and board: semiprivate or 
intensive care accommodations. 
• Some choice of physician. 
• Abroad inpatient facility care and 
prescription purchases. 
• Fixed schedule, payment amounts 
for various dental 
procedures/services. 
• Jump 4 Health Weight 
Management Program (for obese 
children ages 5-17).  
 
FEHB 
Program 
Coverage 
No • 3 Breast-feeding advice 
sessions. 
• Spa treatment prescribed by a 
doctor.  
• Treatment by chiropractor 
without prescription 
• Exercise Programs 
• Services provided by massage 
therapists 
• Acupuncture 
• Hypnotherapists 
 
 31 
 
Swiss Compulsory Coverage  
Yes No 
Yes • Diagnostic and treatment 
services in office 
• General Nursing Care 
• Nutritional Counseling 
• Home nursing care 
• Emergency treatment abroad is 
partially covered.  
• Preventive medical care (i.e. 
screening for HIV, 
gynecological screenings, 
diphtheria and tetanus shots, 
etc.) 
• Blood transfusions 
• Vision examinations 
• Limited physiotherapy 
• Psychological testing 
 
• Room and board: semiprivate or 
intensive care accommodations. 
• Some choice of physician. 
• Cardiac Rehabilitation Program  
• Diabetes Self-Management 
Training 
• Smoking cessation counseling 
 
Medicare 
A & B 
Coverage 
No • 3 Breast-feeding advice 
sessions. 
• Spa treatment prescribed by a 
doctor. 
• Treatment by chiropractor 
without prescription 
 
 
• Dental Care 
• Exercise Programs 
• Services provided by massage 
therapists 
• Acupuncture 
• Hypnotherapists  
Swiss Compulsory Coverage  
Yes No 
Cal 
PERS 
Select 
Yes • Diagnostic and treatment 
services in office 
• General Nursing Care 
• Outpatient Care Services 
• Prescription Drug 
Coverage 
• Nutritional Counseling 
• Speech and occupational 
therapy 
• Home nursing care 
• Emergency treatment 
abroad 
• Preventive medical care 
(i.e. gynecological 
screenings, diphtheria and 
tetanus shots, etc.) 
• Vision examinations 
• Limited physiotherapy 
• Psychological testing 
 
• Room and board: semiprivate or 
intensive care accommodations. 
• Some choice of physician. 
• Substance abuse treatment 
• Inpatient hospital care outside of the 
U.S. 
• Access to prescription medication 
abroad. 
 No • 3 Breast-feeding advice 
sessions. 
• Prescribed spa treatment  
• Treatment by chiropractor 
without prescription. 
 
 
• Dental Care 
• Exercise Programs 
• Services provided by massage therapists 
• Acupuncture 
• Hypnotherapists  
 32 
 
As outlined in the preceding table, the observable differences between Swiss basic 
health insurance and the U.S. plans primarily involve receiving semiprivate rooms during 
hospital stays, coverage abroad, and various rehabilitation and therapy programs.  All 
plans cover the general scope of in-office and inpatient services, general nursing care, 
and preventive medical care.  The FEHB Program is the only policy which covers dental 
care in some way without the purchase of supplementary care.  The ability to choose 
physicians on a limited basis is common throughout all three U.S. plans.  While the costs 
of seeking such out-of-network care are high, this is an option that is not available under 
the Swiss compulsory plan. Conversely, the Swiss plan covers chiropractic care without a 
prescription, as well as spa treatments prescribed by a doctor.  Considering all of the 
information presented, it appears that the U.S. plans represented in this comparison offer 
a slightly more comprehensive benefits package.  The Swiss Basic Compulsory Health 
Plan is by no means unsatisfactory or even “basic” based on its benefits.  Only a small 
subset of patients seeking very specific types of care and coverage would require the 
coverage provided by the U.S. plans.   
 After comparing the various benefits included in the compulsory Swiss plan and 
three American plans, the costs of such plans must be considered.  Part of the purpose of 
this research is to determine the coverage patients actually receive from the insurance 
they pay for in their respective countries.  Due to the cost-sharing characteristics of each 
health insurance plan, a definitive cost for coverage under each policy cannot be 
determined.  We can, however, approximate costs under each policy based on premiums 
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and coinsurance/copayment rates.  Out of pocket payments for policies for one individual 
(with Swiss costs converted into U.S. dollars) are presented in the following table:  
Payment Type Swiss FEHB Medicare A&B LACCD 
Annual Premium 
Paid by 
Consumers 
Average 
across all 
cantons:  
 
$3678.48 
$1,495.78 For following Individual Tax 
Returns: 
<$85,000: $1326.00 
$85,001-$107,000: $1856.40 
$170,001-$214,000: $2652.00 
$160,001–$214,000: $3447.60 
>$214,000: 4243.20 
 
$422.35 
Total Annual 
Premium 
$3678.48 $5,962.08 N/A 
 
$5,458.44 
Deductible Min.: $284.66 
Max:$2365.63 
$300 • $1,100 for hospital 
stay (Part A) 
• $155 for Part B 
 
$500 
Coinsurance (%) 10% of 
amount above 
$284.66 
15% 20% for doctor services 20% 
Copayment $9.49 per day 
during stay in 
hospital 
$20-$30 
$200 per 
hospital 
admission. 
$10-$20 $5-$15 
Max out of pocket 
payment 
10% of 
personal 
income  
(FOPH, 2010) 
$5,000 N/A $3,000 
*Note: Medicare Part A is generally paid if Medicare Taxes are paid while working. Therefore, Medicare A 
& B costs reflect costs for only Part B. 
 
  The most glaring difference between the cost structures of the different plans is 
the size of an average annual premium for basic insurance in Switzerland compared to the 
three American plans included.  At $3,678.48, it is nearly three times the premium paid 
by those covered under the FEHB and Medicare programs (for those earning under 
$85,000), and over 8 times larger than the LACCD CalPERS Select Plan.  The important 
aspect to consider is the ability of Swiss consumers to increase their deductibles in 
exchange for lower premiums.  In fact, in 2008 60% of Swiss consumers elected to 
receive a higher deductible in exchange for a lower premium, resulting in an average 
deductible of roughly $700 and a premium of $3352 (FOPH).  This is in line with 
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Switzerland’s characterization as a market-oriented model.  Patients are held responsible 
for their health care decisions, and as a result they pay for a large portion of the costs.  
Even while paying significantly higher insurance premiums than the insured population 
in the U.S., deductibles are larger and co-pays are comparable to those paid in the United 
States.  Aside from Medicare, which includes a $1,100 deductible for hospital stays, the 
$700 average deductible for Swiss care is only greater than the $300 and $500 for the 
FEHB and LACCD health programs.   
 Important to keep in mind in this comparison is who is paying for this coverage.  
The statistics presented represent costs paid entirely by the policyholder.  In Switzerland, 
aside from government subsidies for low-income households, this covers all health 
insurance costs.  The United States, however, is characterized largely by employer-
sponsored insurance, with most of the costs of health insurance being paid by the 
employer (or in the case of Medicare, the government).   For the LACCD CalPERS 
Select package, for instance, the total annual insurance premium is $5,458.44 (USOPM, 
2010).  Under the Standard Blue Cross and Blue Shield Benefit Option of the FEHB 
Program, total annual premiums amount to $5,962.08 (USOPM, 2010).  According to the 
Kaiser Family Foundation’s Employer Health Benefits Survey for 2009, the average 
annual premium for employer-sponsored health insurance was $4,824 for single coverage.  
Within that amount, employers contributed on average $4,045 (83.9%) and workers 
contributed $779 (16.1%) of the total premium. 
 Even though consumers pay less directly for health insurance in the U.S. than in 
Switzerland, they are by no means saving money.  Since health insurance is tied to 
employment in most cases, the benefit of employers paying for health insurance results in 
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the cost of receiving lower salaries.  Companies do not cover health insurance charges 
out of good will; they simply provide it as a form of compensation.  Additionally, health 
benefit contributions for workers are tax-exempt, incentivizing employers to provide 
health benefits.  Given the option, workers might prefer higher salaries instead of 
comprehensive health benefits provided by their employer.   
 Often overlooked in the analysis of the high cost of health insurance are the 
physicians which administer the care.  Given that physicians in the United States and 
Switzerland pursue profit for their services, physician compensation is an important 
component of health care costs.  For years, American doctors have been known to receive 
significantly higher salaries, not just in absolute terms, but also relative to per-capita 
GDP.  A 2006 study by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
found that specialists in the U.S. earned $230,000, or 5.7 times per-capita GDP.  General 
practitioners (GP), while earning less at $161,000 on average, still earned 4.1 times the 
per capita level.  In Switzerland, specialists received $130,000, amounting to 3.8 times 
their per capita income level, while GPs earned $116,000, or 3.4 times per-capita income.  
The average of all OECD countries for GP and specialist salaries was 3.7 and 2.9 times 
per-capita GDP, respectively.  While the disparity in physician salary seems substantial,  
when the costs of becoming a physician are considered, they seem more reasonable.  
Medical school tuition in Switzerland ranged between $3,000-$4,000 in 2009 (FOPH), 
while resident tuition for public medical schools in the U.S. was $20,233 on average 
(Gaillord).  Considering that tuition costs are lower for resident students and public 
schools, the opportunity cost of becoming a physician is clearly much greater in the U.S.  
Although the full effect of higher tuition on physician salary is unknown, it is clear that 
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higher physician salaries do not account for the entire difference in health insurance costs 
between the U.S. and Switzerland. 
 Research in the past has attempted to identify the specific causes of increasing 
health care costs in the United States.  Various scholars have pointed towards, among 
other factors, an aging American population, increased insurance, and supplier-induced 
demand.  Newhouse (1992) identifies a number of these factors and determines how 
much each change accounts for the growth in real health care expenditures in the United 
States.  Based on his analysis, Newhouse believes that the “bulk of the residual increase 
[in health expenditures] is attributable to technological change… and the increased 
capabilities of medicine” (Newhouse, 1992).  Based on Newhouse’s analysis, the extra 
costs of American insurance could be due to increased technological capabilities.  Is this 
necessarily the case in comparison with Switzerland? 
In order to facilitate this analysis, the type of care delivered in each system must 
be considered.  After all, countries may define certain types of care in different ways.  
For example, both Swiss and American programs could provide “preventive services,” 
but the nature of those services may not be the same.  Essentially, the question is: What is 
actually being paid for in each country?  By measuring the penetration and utilization of 
advanced technology in each system, a more accurate comparison of the type of care 
provided can be provided.  Consider the rate of the following health procedures made in 
the U.S. and Switzerland.   
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Website: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/4/38980557.pdf  
In the case of Caesarean Sections, the United States delivered only slightly more 
births through Caesarean sections than Switzerland (28% versus 25%).  For Coronary 
Revascularization Procedures, however, the U.S. administered over five times the rate of 
these procedures as Switzerland (587 versus 115 per 100,000 population).   Coronary 
revascularization procedures are any procedure used to increase coronary artery blood 
flow, including coronary bypass grafts and coronary angioplasties (OECD, 2009).  These 
procedures involve advanced technology and are believed to produce superior health 
outcomes when compared to traditional medical treatment (OECD, 2009).  Based on the 
large disparity of use of these procedures, it appears that higher use of technology in the 
U.S. may contribute significantly to the higher cost of insurance and health care services.           
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An additional measure of the level of technological innovation within a health 
care system is to compare the number of machines which conduct advanced procedures 
or analyses.  The following figure shows the number of CT Scanners and MRI Units per 
1 million population as of 2004.  As shown, the U.S. has nearly double the number of CT 
Scanners and MRI Units per 1,000,000 population.  This is not to say that Switzerland 
necessarily has an unusually low number of these machines.  Their number of CT 
Scanners is just below the OECD average, while they are well above the MRI average.  
The possibility exists of U.S. numbers being inefficiently high due to supplier-induced 
demand (doctors recommending excessive care).       
Website: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/4/38980557.pdf  
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Utilization of advanced technology does provide insight into the causes of higher 
costs for health care in the U.S., but it does not provide complete information on health 
outcomes.  It appears to be the case that American physicians are trained to utilize more 
technology when treating patients than physicians in other countries.  We do not know 
whether that technology actually serves patients better than more traditional, less 
expensive treatment methods.  The difficulty in this analysis is that comparisons of 
outcomes using international data used to measure quality of treatment are not always 
accurate.  “Infant Mortality per 1,000 live births” is often used as a proxy to measure 
quality of care received, but this statistic is reported differently between countries.  The 
United States often scores poorly for these statistics because it counts very premature 
babies with low chances of survival as “live births.”  Switzerland, on the other hand, does 
not.  As a result, the U.S. infant mortality rate was 6.9 in 2004, compared to 4.2 for 
Switzerland (OECD, 2009). 
 Another statistic often used to measure quality of care is deaths from certain 
diseases per 100,000 population.  Based on this indicator, Switzerland had lower death 
rates per 100,000 population for cancer, cerebro-vascular diseases, diseases of the 
respiratory system, and Diabetes in 2006 (OECD, 2009).  These statistics are not, 
however, an accurate measure of the capabilities of medical care in treating each of these 
diseases.  Statistics for the U.S. are inherently skewed because such a large proportion of 
the population is underinsured or not insured at all.  Death rates are expected to be higher 
because many people with these conditions are receiving little to no care at all.  While 
these statistics may provide insight into the success of the system as a whole, it is not an 
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accurate representation of the effectiveness of treatment given to patients with cancer, 
diabetes, and other diseases.   
Although insurance premiums paid by citizens for compulsory coverage in 
Switzerland are comparably larger than what is paid by those insured in the U.S., many 
households are offered government subsidies offered to help pay their premiums.  
Roughly a third of the population in Switzerland receives subsidies for health insurance, 
on top of the clause which states that no household must commit more than ten percent of 
their total income towards paying for health insurance.  In the United States, any attempt 
to alleviate the financial burden of health care has proved futile.  A joint study by the 
Harvard Law School and Harvard Medical School found that medical bills are the leading 
cause of bankruptcy in the U.S. (Dranove, 2006).   
The analysis of benefits and costs of health insurance plans in the U.S. and 
Switzerland provides valuable information regarding the costs of similar services in each 
country.  Though there are limitations in measuring the quality of care delivered through 
each health care system, notable conclusions can be made regarding cost-cutting and 
access strategies.  While aforementioned statistics such as deaths per 100,000 from 
certain diseases and infant mortality provide some information regarding health care 
quality, it does not control for many external factors.  Lifestyle factors such as diet and 
exercise habits have a significant effect on the outcomes of certain health treatment.  
Even if doctors in Switzerland and the United States are treating the same conditions, 
American cases may be more severe and difficult to treat because of lifestyle 
considerations.   
V. Lessons from the Swiss System 
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Examining the strengths and weaknesses of the Swiss system in mediating the 
problems of asymmetric information, moral hazard, and adverse selection can provide 
useful lessons for U.S. health care reform.   
• For similar benefits, Swiss consumers pay less for health insurance 
The analysis of specific benefits provided and their costs has shown that basic 
compulsory care within Switzerland is comparable to common U.S. benefit packages.  
Though U.S. insurance policies generally contain extended benefits in areas of patient 
privacy and coverage in foreign countries, the Swiss compulsory plan includes 
chiropractic and spa treatment that is not part of American insurance.  It is still uncertain 
given current research whether care delivered in the United States is superior to care 
delivered in Switzerland.  Though the U.S. does utilize more advanced technology in 
treating patients, additional research is required to determine whether this technology 
leads to improved health outcomes.   
• To reduce the cost of health insurance, all citizens must hold health insurance 
While this research is not able to quantify its effects, adverse selection plays a 
large role in the high cost of health insurance in the United States.  As more high-risk 
individuals demand insurance, premiums are driven up, further discouraging low-risk 
people to purchase insurance.  By mandating citizens to purchase health insurance, 
Switzerland has effectively mediated much of the consequences of adverse selection.  In 
the U.S., however, purchasing health insurance is not a requirement, and 15 percent of 
the population does not.  As a result, those who purchase insurance are the people more 
likely to get sick or injured and need the medical care covered by insurance.  As 
evidenced by the insurance benefit and cost analysis in this paper, health insurance costs 
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more in the United States for a very limited amount of extra benefits.  A mandate similar 
to the Swiss basic insurance mandate would decrease the average amount of risk per 
policyholder, effectively decreasing the average price of insurance policies. 
• A standardized insurance plan will reduce administration costs 
 An important facet of the cost-containment conversation in health care has to do 
with administration costs of health insurance.  The United States and Switzerland both 
have multi-payer systems, with a number of different health insurance companies making 
payments on the policyholder’s behalf.  Switzerland is able to control its administrative 
costs relative to the U.S. because every person receives the same standardized benefits 
package.  Furthermore, because insurers providing basic coverage compete primarily on 
price, they have strong incentives to reduce their operating costs.  In the U.S., there are a 
plethora of different coverage programs and policies, raising the administration costs 
significantly.  As consumers do not face the full costs of their purchasing decisions, 
insurers in the U.S. tend to compete more on benefits.  In 2004, spending on health 
administration and insurance in the United States was $465 per capita, which was seven 
times the OECD median (OECD, 2009).  In the same year, Switzerland spent less than 
half that per capita amount, $198.  The extensive number of insurance plans available to 
U.S. citizens is a large contributing factor to high administrative costs and in turn high 
health care costs.   
• Involving more cost-sharing can reduce moral hazard in medical care 
Perhaps the greatest achievement of the Swiss system is its ability to reduce the 
incidence of moral hazard through cost-sharing strategies.  Out-of-pocket payments by 
households constituted 31.5% of total Swiss national health spending in 2002 (Reinhardt, 
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2004).  In the U.S., these payments were only 14.0% of total health expenditures.  Many 
Swiss actually opt to pay a higher deductible and lower premium in order to attempt to 
reduce the costs of health insurance.  It is clear that the more financially involved 
consumers are in their health care purchases, the less inefficiency there will be in the 
market.  Even with this high level of cost-sharing, health expenditures are still relatively 
high in Switzerland.  In fact, as a percentage of GDP, Swiss health expenditures were 
10.8% of GDP in 2007, the third highest among OECD countries (with the U.S. first at 
16.0 percent) (OECD, 2009).  Since Swiss health care consumers are exposed to the costs 
of their health care use, these high costs are more a reflection of Swiss preferences for 
additional health care rather than inefficient spending.  If cost-sharing for consumers 
were set at a similar rate in the U.S., health care expenditures would represent consumer 
preferences for health care rather than inefficient use of care.   
• Universal coverage does not have to be entirely government-financed 
There exists a common misconception that universal coverage can only be 
achieved through a single-payer system.  Swiss health care covers nearly 100 percent of 
citizens through a market-oriented system.  While there is significant government 
regulation, health care is purchased and sold on the private market.  Additionally, there is 
still a market for insurers to earn profits through supplementary coverage.  Switzerland is 
proof that universal coverage can be achieved without placing a huge financial burden on 
federal or state governments.  Furthermore, it does not have to specify all of the care that 
patients receive.  Consumers are given the freedom to decide how much coverage they 
want; the mandate simply sets a minimum.    
• Some level of restriction to access is necessary to keep costs down 
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The Swiss system, while providing a comprehensive set of benefits, does restrict 
access to some physicians and treatments.  Given the scope of the compulsory insurance 
package, the system is already jeopardizing the consumer-driven aspects of the system.  
Any additional benefits would move Swiss health care further away from its successful 
market-oriented strategy and could lead to spiraling health care costs similar to the 
United States.  If the United States were to institute a mandate for health insurance, it 
would need to find the right balance of benefits to provide appropriate access to patients 
but at a reasonable price.  
VI. Conclusion  
 The Swiss health care system provides a useful model for U.S. policymakers to 
consider.  It has avoided the non-price rationing that has plagued other European systems 
that provide universal care, while maintaining a high level of quality.  While it remains 
one of the most expensive in the world, this is largely a result of consumer preferences 
rather than financial support from its government.  An in-depth comparison of the 
compulsory Swiss package and three representative American plans reveals that the 
Swiss receive similar benefits for a smaller (overall) cost.  While consumers pay more 
out-of-pocket, this has kept costs lower due to a smaller moral hazard effect.  
 Certainly, sweeping U.S. reform would and should not look exactly like the Swiss 
system.  Due to the intricacies of each country’s population, politics, and health care 
history, imposing the Swiss model would be undesirable.  The positive aspects of health 
care in Switzerland, however, should be incorporated in some way to the American 
system.  Cost-sharing, mandating the purchase of health insurance, and standardizing 
plans to reduce administrative costs will have positive effects on the performance of the 
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U.S. system.  Inherent challenges of moral hazard and asymmetric information that face 
the health care industry cannot be completely eliminated, but they can be reduced.  
Switzerland’s health care system is one of the best examples of reducing the effects of 
these problems.  By translating Swiss consumer-oriented policies into the American 
health insurance system, the U.S. can address the prevailing deficiencies in access and 
cost-containment practices that characterize the current health care system.     
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